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CONVERSIONARY SALES OF GRAIN IN STORAGE
AND SUBSTITUTION BY OPERATION OF LAW
OF AFTER-ACQUIRED GRAIN-A BRIEF ANAL-
YSIS.
LAWRENCE VOLD*
G RAIN may be delivered to the elevator for storage in a com-
mon mass with grain belonging to other depositors or belonging
to the bailee himself. Where the bailee in such cases without
legal authority ships out and sells more than his own proportion
of the grain on deposit, the bailee's act as to such excess amounts
to a conversion for which not only he but also his purchaser is
subject to liability., It has been held in some cases, moreover,
that if the bailee thereafter acquires or keeps in the elevator
grain of his own of the same kind and quality as that converted,
the interest of the previous depositors of the converted grain
attaches under their contracts by operation of law to this sub-
sequently acquired grain.2  Accordingly, courts taking this view
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1. This point is elaborately examined in Kastner v. Andrews, 49 N. D. 1059,
194 N.W. 824, 1923. See also to the same general effect on this point, Hall v.
Pillsbury, 43 Minn. 33, 44 N.W. 673, 1890; Torgerson v. Quinn-Shepherdson Co., 161
Minn. 380, 201 N.W. 615, 1925; Heuther v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co. 52 N. D. 721,
204 N.W. 614, 1925; Tobin v. Portland Mills Co., 41 Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 743, 1108,
1902; Kimbell Milling Co. v. Greene, 11 Tex. 84, 170 S.W.2d 191, 1943.
The leading case contra with respect to the bona fide purchaser apparently is
Preston v. Witherspoon, 109 Ind. 457, 9 N.E. 585, 58 Am. Rep. 417, 1886. As
reasons for protecting the subsequent purchaser from the bailee at the expense of
the original depositor, this case relies heavily on the doctrine of apparent authority
but does not show how apparent authority to sell is here to be derived from mere
delivery of possession, that mere circumstance ordinarily being insufficient either as a
basis for estoppel or as a basis for inferring authority to sell. It also invokes the
Janus-faced formula that he who made the transaction possible by making the deposit
rather than the purchaser should bear the risk of the bailee's misconduct. It fails to
notice, however, that the purchaser's act in buying as well as the depositor's act
in storing was necessary to make the transaction possible and that actually both had
equally trusted the bailee not to exceed his authority.
The court in Kastner v. Andrews, 49 N. D. 1059, 194 N.W. 824 at p. 829, 1923,
in disapproving and refusing to follow Preston v. Witherspoon, stated as follows:
"The purchaser likewise knows the character of the business transacted by the ware-
houseman and knows that in the ordinary conduct of such business he will both
purchase grain and receive it for storage. This carries notice that his right to sell is
limited to the excess above what is required to meet the outstanding storage receipts.
. . . Hence no reason is apparent for making an exception to the rule of caveat emptor."
Under the proposed Uniform Commercial Code, sec. 2-403 (2), however, "Any
entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind
gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course
of business." The bearing of this legislative proposal for a change of policy in this
respect to delivery of possession to merchants is discussed elsewhere.
2. Torgerson v. Quinn-Shepherdson Co., 161 Minn. 380, 201 N.W. 615, 1925;
Carson State Bank v. Grant Grain Co., 50 N. D. 558, 197 N.W. 146, 1924; State
ex rel. Hermann v. Farmer Elevator Co., 59 N. D. 679, 231 N.W. 725, 1930; State ex
rel. Harding v. Hoover Grain Co., 63 N. D. 344, 248 N.W. 275, 1933.
The language of the court in Carson State v. Grant Grain Co., 50 N. D. 558,
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have said either by dictum or actually decision that the bailee's
later substitution of other grain before demand cures the tort
of the original conversion.3 and that the bailee's subsequent un-
authorized sale of such later stored grain is a new conversion.4
Some legal writers have regarded this position concerning
substituted grain as anomalous and unsound. 5 Such critics inti-
mate, in effect, that this does not follow the ordinary rules of
tort and property law, and that while the concept of estoppel
can perhaps justify this position with respect to the bailee him-
self, it is improper to apply this position against innocent pur-
chasers from the bailee to the prejudice of the marketing system.
It would seem, too, that certain provisions in the proposed Uni-
form Commercial Code, if given literal application in this con-
nection, would force modification of these decisions in order to
protect later purchasers of grain in the ordinary course of busi-
ness.6  Thus, the proposed Uniform Commercial Code raises, at
this point, a question of how far an original owner's property
interest is to be subject to sacrifice at this expense in favor of
the policy of marketing convenience for later purchasers, instead
of protecting the original owner of the property under the ordi-
nary application of the rule that a buyer can acquire from his
seller no more than his seller has.
7
197 N.W. 146, 1924, is broad enough to apply this position not only to grain which
the bailee thereafter actually buys, but also to grain of later depositors there received
in storage. So broad an application, however, would seem highly questionable. So
broadly applied, it would be hard to avoid the conclusion that it was in effect merely
robbing Peter in part in order to pay Paul in part, a position not likely to have been
intended either by legislature or court. Accordingly, the suggestion in 25 N. D. Bar Briefs,
118 at p. 119, fI. 5, that grain of later depositors there received in storage would be
thus affected even though not acquired by the bailee seems highly questionable.
3. State ex rel. Hermann v. Farmers Elevator Co., 59 N. D. 679, 231 N.W. 275,
1933; Kvame v. Farmers Co-operative Elevator Co., 66 N. D. 54, N.W. 242, 1935.
This position is of course exceptional under the American authorities on conver-
sion which at most recognize a privilege to return converted chattels only in mitiga-
tion of damages rather than in extinction of the cause of action. See, the Restatement
of Torts, sec. 247; Prosser on Torts, pp. 110-111.
4. In addition to the cases cited in fn. 2 above, see also Kvame v. Farlsers
Co-operative Elevator Co., 66 N, D. 54, 262 N.W. 242, 1935.
5. See Brown on Personal Property (1936) at pp. 265-266;. 29 Mich.L.Rev., 624
(1931); 9 Minn.L.Rev. 690 (1925); 3 Wis.L.Rev. 375 (1926). Viewing such cases
more favorably, however, see N. D. Bar Briefs 118 (1949.)
6. The proposed Uniform Commercial Code, sec. 2-403 (2) provides that
"Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind
gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course
of business." See also the proposed Uniform Commercial Code, sec. 7-205, and com-
ment no. 1, thereto. This comment indicates the draftman's opinion that an elevator
operator who both deals in grain and accepts grain for storage should under these
provisions be regarded as "a merchant who deals in goods of that kind."
7. See, for instance, the Uniform Sales Act, sec. 23, subdivision (1), which
provides as follows: "Subject to the provisions of this act, where goods are sold by
a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority
or with title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by
his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell."
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On the other hand, tending on the merits to support the posi-
tion regarding substituted grain taken in the before-mentioned
cases is a group of at least six legal and policy aspects, the strength
of whose combination in this regard is very impressive. Natur-
ally, not all of these aspects are elaborately developed in any
single one of the opinions in these cases. These six legal and
policy aspects may be enumerated as follows:
(1) The express terms of certain of the local statutes involved
have at least tended to favor this interpretation of their pro-
visions.'
(2) In the agricultural states where these decisions have been
rendered, the basic purpose of the pertinent local statutes
dealing with the storing and handling of grain has often
been understood to be protection for the farmer-grower of
grain rather than protection of later purchasers at the farm-
er-grower's expense. 9
(3) If the farmer-depositor would prevail against the bailee
himself on some basis related to estoppel, the bailee's pur-
chaser who merely gets what his seller has can under the
doctrine of caveat emptor acquire no greater interest.1"
(4) There is a line of somewhat analogous English cases which
recognize in the court a discretion to hold that in the ab-
sence of other enhancement of damages a tender in court
8. Statutory provisions in substance declaring that storage of grain with an
agreement to return an equal amount in kind though not the identical grain deposited
constitutes a bailment have been thus interpreted. Torgerson v. Quinn-Shepherdson
Co., 161 Minn. 380, 201 N.W. 615, 1925; Carson State Bank v. Grant Grain Co.,
50 N. D. 558, 197 N.W. 146, 1924; Stutsman v. Cook, 53 N. D. 162, 204 N.W.
976, 981; Kvam,' v. Farmers Co-operative Elevator Co., 66 N. D. 54, 262 N.W.
242, 244, 1935. In South Dakota Wheat Growers Ass. v. Farmers Grain Co., - S. D. -,
237 N.W. 723, 1931, lAowever, somewhat similar statutory language in a different
statutory setting was construed as authorizing a sale.
9. Hall v. Pillsbury, 43 Minn. 33, 44 N.W. 673, 1890; Torgerson v. Quinn-
Shepherdson Co., 161 Minn. 380, 280 N.W. 615, 616, 1925; Stutsman v. Cook, 53 N. D.
162, 204 N.W. 976, 982, 1925; Kvame v. Farmers Co-operative Elevator Co., 66
N. D. 54, 262 N.W. 242, 246, 1935.
10. Kendall Produce Co., Inc. v. Terminal Warehouse & Transfer Co., 295
Pa. 450, 145 Atl. 511, 512, 1929 (beans).
Estoppel by deed in real estate transactions in this connection affords a sug-
gestive analogy which is somewhat remote on account of the legal effort of recording
acts. For discussion of the conflicting authorities on whether a purchaser is bound
by such estoppel by deed with respect to after-acquired property of his grantor, see
Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed. 1939) sec. 1234.
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of return of converted goods is a good answer to an action
of trover.5 '
(5) The concept of constructive trust in the proceeds of the
converted grain and "following the res" into new grain ac-
quired with the proceeds as a matter of law can give -the
original depositor an interest in the substituted grain, to
which from the outset purchasers affected with notice of
this practice in the grain business are subject."-'
(6) Transfer of interests in after-acquired property by pperation
of law, recognized in certain legal settings, can also be here
invoked in order to attain, in the practical situation, that
protection for the farmer-grower of grain which it is under-
stood the legislative policy of the state in question seeks to
achieve.:
11 The leading English case on the point is Fisher v. Prince, 3 Burr. 1365, 1782.
Occasional American cases have taken a similar view, as in Whittler v. Sharp, 43
Utah, 419, 135 Pac. 112, 1913. The great -weight of American authority on the point,
however, seems to he that a converter cannot, by returning the converted goods with-
out the injured party's consent, bar either the action or the damages. See Prosser on
Torts, pp. 110-111, with authorities cited. Under the Restatement of Torts, see. 247,
where a conversion was in good faith and the converted chattel remains unimpaired,
a converter can mitigate the damages by a tender of return made promptly after dis-
covery of the mistake and kept good, but cannot thereby completely bar the action
for conversion.
12. That the law of constructive trusts is appliable to the proceeds of converted
property, which can be followed into mingled funds in bank accounts and into other
property paid for out of such mingled funds, see Scott on Trusts, sees. 508.1, 508.2,
515, 516. and cases cited; Bogert on Trusts & Trustees, sees. 476, 921, 923, 924.
and cases cited. In such cases purchasers with such knowledge of facts as to put them
on inquiry take subject to this constructive trust. See, Scott on Trusts, sees. 296, 297,
476 and cases cited; Bogert on Trusts & Trustees, sees. 881, 882 and 894.
That purchasers in the grain business have notice of the prevalent practices
therein can be found to be thus on inquiry is in substance indicated in the following
quotation from Kastner v. Andrews, 49 N. D. 1059, 194 N.W. 824, 829, 1923, which
was uttered with reference to a closely analogous matter: "The purchaser likewise
knows the character of the business transacted by the warehouseman, and knows that
in the ordinary conduct of such business he will both purchase grain and receive it for
storage. This carries notice that his right to sell is limited to the excess above what is
required to meet the outstanding storage receipts."
13 A conspicuous instance in another legal setting is the case of Grantham v.
Hawley, Hobart 132, 1916, under the rule of which at common law crops, wool, and
the young of animals could be effectively sold before they came into existence if
the seller at the time owned the land, sheep, or animals, from which the goods in
question were to be raised. The title was held to pass by operation of law under the
contract as soon as the goods in question came into existence. This matter is discussed
at greater length in Void on Sales (1931) at pp. 104-109. Another instance is found
in the familiar doctrine of equitable mortgages on after-acquired property, as to which,
see Void on Sales (1931) pp. 109-115.
